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Abstract: Suppose I am a leeway sceptic: I think that, 
whenever I face a choice between two courses of action, I lack 
true alternatives. Can my practical deliberation be rational? 
Call this the Deliberation Question. This paper has three aims 
in tackling it. Its constructive aim is to provide a unified 
account of practical deliberation. Its corrective aim is to 
amend the way that philosophers have recently framed the 
Deliberation Question. Finally, its disputative aim is to argue 
that leeway sceptics cannot deliberate entirely rationally about 
what to do, because of the connection between deliberating 
and deciding. 
Keywords: practical deliberation, provisions, decisions, 
rationality, leeway scepticism, Deliberation Question. 
1. Introduction 
Suppose that Cate deliberates about whether to award the Palme d’Or to The Wild 
Pear Tree or to Shoplifters. The first contains exceptional shots, but the acting of 
the second is superior. She finds it hard to choose. Now imagine Cate comes to 
believe that one of the films is ineligible (perhaps not knowing which) or that 
she is not on the jury. In a sense, she can no longer deliberate rationally about 
which film to award the prize to. 
Suppose instead that Cate comes to believe she has no free will in one sense 
of the term. More precisely, she thinks she lacks leeway, i.e. the ability and 
opportunity to choose amongst real alternatives. At no point, Cate thinks, she 
could have truly said: ‘I could have done otherwise’.1 Being a leeway sceptic, can 
she still deliberate rationally about what to do? Call this the Deliberation 
Question. It is important because there are strong reasons for being a leeway 
sceptic2, as the free will debate has long demonstrated, and for valuing 
rationality, as epistemologists have often maintained.3 
 
* I wish to thank Ralf Bader, David Campbell, Marc-Kevin Daoust, Samuel Dishaw, 
Claire Field, Tanya Goodchild, Alexander Greenberg, Alison Hills, John Hyman, 
Maximilian Kiener, Clayton Littlejohn, Dana Nelkin, Karen Margrethe Nielsen, Yuuki 
Ohta, and Johanna Schnurr for their invaluable comments. I am also grateful to the 
FRQSC for its financial support. 
1 Leeway sceptics can deny the existence of all abilities, of the ability to do otherwise, 
or of the opportunity to do otherwise. For a useful discussion, see Vihvelin (2014, 13). 
2 The term is unusual, but there are many leeway sceptics.  Such are free will sceptics who 
think either that free will is leeway (perhaps hard determinists like Holbach and 
Spinoza) or that it implies leeway (Pereboom 2014, Levy 2011), but also free will 
believers who are happy to concede that we lack leeway because free will is, in their 
view, unrelated to leeway (Dennett 2015, Fischer 1994). 
3 See e.g. Broome (2013) and Kiesewetter (2017). 
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The Deliberation Question raises controversy, which has been expressed in 
different terms. We can simplify the literature by splitting it into two camps. 
Alexander of Aphrodisias (De Fato), A.C. MacIntyre (1957), Richard Taylor 
(1966), Hector Castañeda (1975), Peter van Inwagen (1983), E.J. Coffman and 
Ted Warfield (2005), John Searle (2007), and Yishai Cohen give a negative answer 
to the Deliberation Question. Cate’s leeway scepticism is a barrier to her 
deliberating rationally. On the other side of the aisle, Bruce Waller (1985), Tomis 
Kapitan (1986), Philip Pettit (1989), Randolph Clarke (1992), Dana Nelkin 
(2004, 2011), Karen Nielsen (2011), and Derk Pereboom (2008, 2014) give a 
positive answer to the Deliberation Question. Accordingly, while Cate is irrational 
in deliberating when she believes she is not on the jury or that one of the films 
is ineligible, her leeway scepticism is no impediment to her rational deliberation. 
As the above lists confirms, sympathy for leeway scepticism is more prominent 
amongst those who think that sceptics can deliberate rationally. 
In order to make progress on the Deliberation Question, we need to be 
clear on what practical deliberation consists in. Thus, my first goal in this paper 
is constructive: in §2, I offer a unified account of practical deliberation. It is 
rational in that it is subject to rational requirements. It is decisional in that it aims 
at issuing decisions. It is finally provisional in that it is typically run on practical 
assumptions, not just on beliefs. These three properties interact. 
We can use this account to revisit the Deliberation Question. Accordingly, 
my second goal is corrective: in §3, I amend the way that philosophers have 
approached it. In the last century, philosophers4 asked whether good 
deliberation required belief in leeway. More recently, philosophers turned to 
whether good deliberation is incompatible with a belief in determinism.5 These two 
questions must be answered negatively, but for mainly insubstantial reasons. 
The right question to ask is whether good deliberation requires a disbelief in the 
lack of leeway (an equivalent to the deliberative question). 
The answer is that leeway sceptics cannot fully deliberate rationally. My 
third goal is disputative: in §4, I champion an argument for this. Here it is, in a 
nutshell. To deliberate rationally about several courses of action, we must be 
able to decide in favour of one of them. But, to rationally decide in favour of a 
course of action, we must not believe that we cannot pursue it. This, I think, 
implies that the leeway sceptic is barred from rationally deciding in typical 
deliberation. She can only introspect or theorise. This argument raises many 
objections, some of which I address in §5. 
Before I start, let me insist that the three main parts of my paper are linked 
and yet independent. Someone may adopt my account of deliberation and my 
 
4 See e.g. Taylor (1966) and van Inwagen (1983). 
5 See e.g. Nelkin (2011) and Pereboom (2014). 
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way of framing the Deliberation Question even if, in the end, my disputative 
argument falls short of convincing her that leeway sceptics cannot deliberate 
rationally. This paper invites her to ask the Deliberation Question afresh. 
2. Construction: A Unified Account of Practical Deliberation 
Practical deliberation is the activity of deciding what to do on the basis of 
reasons. I explore in turn three properties of deliberation: it is decisional, 
rational, and provisional. 
2.1 A Decisional Activity 
Practical deliberation is decisional: its aim is to make a decision (see Taylor 1966, 
168). Other philosophers agree in different words. They claim that deliberation 
is a form of reasoning or active thought whose aim is to form ‘an intention to 
do something’ (Clarke 1992, 107), or to make ‘a commitment to a course of 
action’ (Watson 2003, 175-176). Practical deliberation is thus a conative activity 
whose aim is a decision rather than a cognitive activity whose aim is a belief.6 
That is not to deny that practical deliberation includes the identification or at 
least the weighing of reasons.7 But once we have figured out the reasons 
supporting each course of action, we need to weigh them and to make a 
decision. As J.L. Austin colourfully puts it:  
‘Deliberation is not just any kind of thinking prior to action […]. Ways 
and means are a matter for the planning staff; decision is a matter for 
the commander.’ (1979, 286) 
This becomes especially clear in cases of irresolvable dilemmas, where we have 
no commensurable reason to favour one option over another (see Sartre 1946). 
Theoretical deliberation might be over, but practical deliberation will not end 
before a decision is made.  
The Deliberation Question concerns only practical deliberation. For there 
is nothing objectionable with the thought of someone deliberating theoretically, 
say about how long it would take to take the train from Geneva to Venice, while 
thinking that there is one good answer. There are fundamentally three questions 
concerning one’s future conduct one can deliberate about: Shall I Φ or Ψ?  
Should I Φ or Ψ? Will I Φ or Ψ? 
We can associate different kinds of deliberative activities to these questions. 
The first question concerns primarily practical deliberation—in answering it we 
make a decision. The second and the third concern primarily theoretical 
 
6 It is contentious whether the conclusion of practical reasoning is action (Aristotle, On 
The Soul¸433a13–20), intention (Broome 2013), or belief (Raz 1999). I leave this aside. 
7 See Clarke (1992, 107–8), Watson (2003, 176), Pereboom (2008, 291). Coffman and 
Warfield (2005, 28) exclude the weighing of reasons from practical deliberation to 
distinguish it more sharply from theoretical deliberation. 
4 
 
 
deliberation—in answering such questions we form a belief. But these activities 
are linked: we typically ask the second in order to answer the first. Yet the fact 
that practical deliberation involves theoretical reasoning does not make practical 
reason a kind of theoretical reasoning (see Watson 2003, 176). 
2.2 A Rational Activity 
Like theoretical deliberation, practical deliberation is a rational activity: it is 
subject to norms of rationality. The exact specification of these norms is 
controversial (as we shall see in §3.2), but individual cases are usually clear. We 
could not, for instance, deliberate rationally about whether to spend the 
weekend on the Moon or on Mars. 
It is interesting to ask what kind of irrationality is at stake in clear cases. 
Instrumental rationality must be partly concerned: it is pointless to deliberate 
about whether to go to the Moon or to Mars. But it seems that there is 
something more going on. Even if deliberation can have a positive effect on my 
life or on my conduct, this can simply be in virtue of the fact that being irrational 
is sometimes beneficial. Deliberating about whether to accept a job that I was 
not offered might put me in a good mood. It might even cause me to get the 
job. Take the Kavka-like case (1983, 33–34) where an eccentric Dean tells me 
that if I deliberate about whether to accept a tenure-track job I was not offered, 
he will offer it to me. Some irrationality clearly remains as I proceed. The Dean 
has asked me in effect to be irrational in exchange for some of my ends. It seems 
then that, just like there seems to be such a thing as effective but irrational 
beliefs, there is such a thing as effective but irrational deliberation.8 
One way to capture the irrationality I have in mind is to emphasise the 
difference between the irrationality to deliberate and the irrationality in 
deliberating.9 The first might simply be instrumental: it is rational to deliberate 
when it is a good means-to-end activity. The second form of irrationality, 
irrationality in deliberating, is different. Deliberating well does not mean that it is 
useful to deliberate, and vice versa. Compare it being rational to play Monopoly 
(whether to initiate, pursue, or finish a game) with playing Monopoly rationally. 
What is irrational deliberation in this second sense? Here, I think that we 
have three options. We may first give it an epistemic reading (see van Inwagen 
1983, 155–160). Suppose that prior to deliberating about whether to go to Mars 
or to the Moon to spend the weekend, I believe it is impossible for me to travel 
in a spaceship in the foreseeable future. In deliberating, it seems likely that I will 
form some beliefs, such as the belief that I can in fact get on a spaceship by 
Friday. This would lead me to hold contradictory beliefs. I might instead 
 
8 The eccentric Dean is a fink.  
9 This is not the distinction between starting and maintaining deliberation, which I ignore. 
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abandon, for no reason, my belief that I cannot travel in a spaceship in the 
foreseeable future. In either case, I would clearly be epistemically irrational.  
Second, we can give irrational deliberation an activity-specific reading. Without 
forming any new beliefs, I might become guilty of deliberative irrationality. I 
somehow fail to follow the norms of deliberation. Here, we can use the 
distinction between right and wrong kinds of reasons.10 In deliberating about 
whether to accept a job I am not offered, I respond to the wrong kind of 
reasons, i.e. the fact that an eccentric Dean wants me to deliberate. 
Third, we can claim that (very) irrational deliberation is no longer 
deliberation. Perhaps I simply cannot deliberate about whether to accept the 
job. I might be merely daydreaming or deliberating about a different question. 
We do not need to take a stance on which of the three answers is the best. 
In fact, they can be combined. An irrational deliberator is sometimes not truly 
deliberating; at other times, she makes deliberative or epistemic mistakes. We 
can be oecumenical because our question is what is required for rational 
deliberation, not for deliberation or for rationality.11 
One last point on the rationality that I am interested in. Whether it is 
epistemic or activity-specific, rationality can be described as more or less 
substantive. We find in the literature a variety of views of rationality, ranging 
from structural requirements like coherence (see e.g. Broome 2013) to the more 
substantive requirement that one responds to reasons (see e.g. Kiesewetter 
2017). We should note that even on substantive views, it must sometimes be 
rational for someone to reach a false conclusion, if only because she had 
misleading evidence. Similarly, practical deliberation involving false beliefs can 
be rational. Galen’s deliberation whether to use bloodletting on a patient is not 
de facto irrational because his belief that bloodletting can be effective is false. 
Decision-making also has some rational constraints. I cannot rationally 
decide to go to the Moon this weekend any more than I can deliberate about 
whether to spend my weekend there. Now, since deliberation is a decisional 
activity, constraints on decision-making are somehow inherited by deliberation. 
What I can decide influences what I can deliberate about. The decisional nature 
of deliberation interacts with its rational nature. 
2.3 A Provisional Activity 
Deliberation is rational and decisional. Whether it is rational depends on the 
relationship between one’s deliberation and one’s resulting decision. This raises 
 
10 See e.g. Kelly (2003), Hieronymi (2005), Schroeder (2007), and Nolfi (2018). 
11 Even Coffman and Warfield, who want to focus on the requirements of deliberation 
simpliciter, eventually slip to rational deliberation (2005, 43–44). 
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a new question: what can we decide rationally? The answer depends, in turn, on 
the relationship between one’s decision and one’s action. 
To better understand this relation, we should first note that our decisions 
are frustrated all the time. Thus, many of our decisions are conditional. ‘If I work 
well today, I will come to the pub later’, ‘I will pick up the vegetable box, on the 
condition that it does not rain’, etc. are our daily bread. Not all our decisions are 
conditional, however. We feel the need to add conditions when we think that 
the link between our decision and our action would otherwise be too weak, 
perhaps too weak to make a promise. 
An overreaction to this phenomenon is to claim that, truly, we should 
severely circumscribe our decisions (and perhaps our promises) to what is under 
our strict control. It is in this spirit that Stoics like Cleanthes and Chrysippus 
located human agency in a realm that humans presumably had full control over; 
walking, they say, really happens in the soul.12 In accordance with this 
suggestion, it only makes sense to make decisions about these mental actions. 
Decisions, to use a different terminology, should only be about attempts. I shall 
‘soul-walk’ or ‘attempt to walk’ and hope that this makes me walk. But even this 
radical proposal assumes, problematically, that we fully control something that 
we do not. Having decided to try to run, I can fail because I fall asleep or forget, 
just as I can fail to run because my ankle is strained. It’s simply easier to try to 
Φ than to Φ, at least normally. 
In a similar spirit, we might limit our rational decisions to the realm of what 
we know. I do not know that I will not be sick next weekend so I will not accept 
your invitation without specifying a conditional. This, again, seems like an 
overreaction. 
 A more moderate reaction, which has been implicit in much of the 
literature on free will and deliberation13 is that it is some reasonable beliefs that 
matter to deliberation. It is not irrational of me to accept your invitation if I 
believe that I will not be sick next weekend, provided that it is reasonable. 
But even this moderate suggestion is not quite right. What directly 
constrains our deliberation is not our beliefs, but what we can assume practically, 
which I call provisions.14 James decides to take Oxford Street rather than Divinity 
Street to go to work. He might not believe (although he certainly has some 
credence) that it is accessible. But he has assumed that these options are open 
in deliberating. Differently put, he commits to using these provisions as 
 
12 See Moral Letters to Lucilius (113, 23). 
13 See §3. An exception is Castañeda (1975, 134–135), whose view places constraints 
on deliberation in terms of assumptions rather than beliefs. 
14 Bratman (1992) and Cohen (1989) call the relevant attitude ‘acceptance’.  
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premises in practical reasoning.15 And this is reasonable, since he has no reason 
to believe that they are blocked. My suggestion, then, is not that beliefs are 
irrelevant to deliberation but that they are indirectly relevant. What I 
(reasonably) believe limits what I can assume; and what I can assume limits what 
I can decide rationally and so what I can deliberate about rationally. 
Upon closer examination, most of our decisions are constrained by 
provisions, i.e. propositions we do not believe but which we assume for practical 
purposes to be true. We more or less always decide ‘insha’Allah’ (if God wills).16 
For instance, I have no belief about the year of my death. But I certainly can 
make some provision, for instance that I will still be alive in five years. Most of 
my long-term decisions implicitly contain this proposition.17 To be clear: this is 
not to say that all our decisions are conditional. ‘S decides to Φ if A (i.e. having 
merely supposed that A)’ is different from ‘S decides to Φ provided that A (i.e. 
having practically assumed that A)’. 
No surprise, then that there are constraints on provision. James can decide 
to take Oxford Street (provided implicitly that it is accessible). But he cannot 
decide to buy a yacht (provided implicitly that he wins the lottery). It is not just 
that James will buy a yacht insha’Allah; it is that he will only buy a yacht if he is 
very lucky. Assuming this is irrational. The provisional nature of deliberation 
interacts with its decisional and rational nature.  
In sum, practical deliberation has three main properties. First, it is decisional: 
practical deliberation aims at making a decision rather than forming a belief. 
Second, deliberation is rational: it is an activity which is subject to normative 
constraints of rationality. Third, it is provisional: in deliberating we form 
practical assumptions and whether we deliberate rationally directly depends on 
what we assume (and indirectly on what we believe). These three properties 
interact. What we can assume in deciding is constrained by norms of rationality. 
And whether it is rational to deliberate in some circumstances depends on what 
it is rational to decide and assume. These interactions unify the account. 
  
 
15 This is one of Cohen’s way of distinguishing acceptance from belief (1989, 368). 
16 John Hyman was the insightful author of this phrase. 
17 Bratman (1992, 8) discusses this kind of examples. 
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3. Correction: The Deliberation Question 
We can now use this unified account to clarify the debate about practical 
deliberation and free will. In §3.1, I argue that the interesting question to ask is 
not whether determinists can deliberate rationally. The interesting question is the 
Deliberation Question: whether the leeway sceptic can deliberate rationally. After 
examining the two main responses to this question in §3.2, I show, in §3.3, that 
both sides have made some minor mistakes. 
3.1 Determinism or Leeway? A Correction from Rationality. 
Several philosophers have asked18: can determinists deliberate? Deliberation 
incompatibilists answer ‘no’ while deliberation compatibilists answer ‘yes’. This, 
however, is not the right question to ask, for its (positive) answer turns on 
insubstantial reasons. This is my first correction to the dialectic. 
Believing in determinism is certainly compatible with rational deliberation. 
This is simply because a subject can rationally believe in compatibilism, that is 
the thesis that determinism is compatible with the ability and opportunity to 
choose amongst real alternatives. If some determinists cannot rationally 
deliberate, it is only in virtue of the combination of determinism and of a further 
belief, namely a belief in incompatibilism. 
In fact, even if compatibilism were false, it would not follow that 
determinists could not deliberate rationally. For a belief in compatibilism, 
whether true or not, can be rational.19 As we have seen in §2.2, rationality might 
be related to structural requirements like coherence or substantive requirements 
like responsiveness to reasons. On both views of rationality, one can rationally 
arrive at a false conclusion.  
This can dispel some confusion in the literature. In defining deliberation 
compatibilism, Pereboom takes as a starting point (2008, 288; 2014, 106) that it 
is ‘evident’ that if determinism is true, leeway scepticism is true. And Cohen 
(2018, 87) stipulates that the relevant form of rationality implies having a true 
belief about the compatibility question between determinism and leeway. As I 
have argued, these assumptions are mistaken. Moreover, they are unnecessary. 
We can circumnavigate the concept of determinism altogether by asking the 
Deliberation Question: can leeway sceptics deliberate? This is the substantial 
question. It cannot be dissolved because of the reasonableness of 
compatibilism, for leeway sceptics are not compatibilists. And it captures the 
 
18 See Taylor (1966, 181–84), Waller (1985, 48), Nelkin (2004, 215–18), Pereboom 
(2008, 288–89), Henden (2010, 313), Nielsen (2011, 283–84), and Cohen (2018, 87). 
19 See Coffman and Warfield (2005, 29) for a similar point. If anything, it is a belief in 
libertarianism that might not be fully rational; see Chevarie-Cossette (forthcoming).  
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heart of the underlying problem that Pereboom’s and Cohen’s question were 
driving at. It tackles the paradoxical nature of choosing where there is no option. 
How come philosophers have not seen this? I suspect that the vocabulary 
of ‘compatibilism’ has a disproportionate appeal. But the main culprit seems to 
be that after Harry Frankfurt’s attack on the view that responsibility requires 
alternatives, philosophers have neglected the concept of leeway. Regardless of 
whether it is a requirement of responsibility, leeway can be an ingredient of 
rational deliberation. 
3.2 An Antinomy about Sceptical Deliberation 
Is a belief in leeway necessary for rational deliberation? To answer this question, 
philosophers have considered cases of irrational deliberation and tried to 
diagnose the source of this irrationality. This reveals principles which then can 
be used to determine whether leeway sceptics can deliberate rationally. We 
consider these cases and principles before we turn to a second amendment in 
§3.3. 
Take again Cate. If she believes she is not on the Cannes jury, she cannot 
rationally deliberate about which film to award the Palme d’or to (although she can 
deliberate about other questions). The same goes in all kinds of situations: if 
Cate believes that The Wild Pear Tree is not eligible for the prize; if she believes 
that she is incapable of writing down her vote; or if she believes that whatever 
she decides she will vote impulsively for the first one. 
Why can’t Cate rationally deliberate about which movie to vote for in each 
of these cases? An immediately attractive explanation is the following principle: 
Specific Disbelief:20 If S deliberates rationally about whether to 
Φ or Ψ, then S does not believe that she cannot Φ and S does 
not believe that she cannot Ψ.21  
A few clarifications, which will also apply to future principles, are in order. First, 
Φ and Ψ are incompatible actions or omissions. Second, Specific Disbelief is a 
doxastic requirement on deliberation. The limits on rational deliberation come 
from what the agent believes or does not believe. Third, by ‘S can Φ’, I mean 
that S has the ability and opportunity to Φ. 
Specific Disbelief gives us the right verdict that, in all the cases, Cate does 
not deliberate rationally. In the first two cases, she believes that she lacks an 
opportunity; in the third and fourth that she lacks an ability. It also allows that 
leeway sceptics deliberate rationally. They do not know which of their options 
is specifically closed; it will only be revealed to them once they have decided. 
 
20 ‘Disbelief’ here (as in the OED) means absence of belief, not belief of a negation. 
21  See Pettit (1989) and Nielsen (2011, 410). 
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Cate’s example was mainly for us to try our hand. Consider the more 
important following example, inspired by cases raised by Taylor (1966, 177–78) 
and van Inwagen (1983, 153): 
Cinema: Beau wants to go to the cinema. He deliberates about 
whether to see Isle of Dogs or The Square. He then learns that one 
of the two is no longer showing, but he does not know which one. 
He keeps deliberating as if he had not learnt anything. 
Specific Disbelief does not explain Beau’s irrationality. Yet he is clearly irrational. 
This is an intuition that almost all participants to the debate have registered 
about structurally identical cases.22 
Of course, Beau can deliberate about other questions. He can deliberate 
about what he shall try first. He can deliberate about what he thinks he will end 
up doing. He might be painfully aware of how much he tends to follow the film 
critiques out of snobbery and thus suspect that he will pick The Square. He can 
deliberate about what he would pick, were both options available, which is akin to 
daydreaming. He can also try to figure out which of the movie is in fact showing. 
But Beau is irrational if he deliberates about whether to see Isle of Dogs or The Square. 
How should we explain Beau’s irrationality? A proposal is the popular23 
Belief about Opportunity and Ability Thesis (BOAT): 
BOAT: If S deliberates rationally about whether to Φ or Ψ, then 
S believes that she can Φ and that she can Ψ. 
If BOAT were true, the leeway sceptics could not rationally deliberate. In 
deliberating, they would be irrational either by making an epistemic or 
deliberative mistake; alternatively, they would merely be daydreaming (see §2.2). 
Those who think that sceptics can deliberate grant that Beau is irrational in 
deliberating. But they have an alternative explanation to BOAT. It is tempting 
for them to rephrase BOAT as a principle about epistemic availability.24 For S to 
deliberate about whether to Φ or Ψ, S must believe that each is compatible with 
what she knows. So, since Φ and Ψ are exclusive, sceptical deliberators must 
not yet believe or be certain either that they will Φ or that they will Ψ. Since 
sceptics—like any of us—are mostly ignorant or uncertain about what they will 
do prior to deliberating, this requirement sits well with deliberation 
compatibilism. However, like Specific Disbelief, this principle does not explain 
Beau’s irrationality. Going to see The Square and going to see Isle of Dogs are both 
 
22 Taylor (1966, 177–78), van Inwagen (1983, 154; 2017, 184), Waller (1985, 49), 
Kapitan (1986, 247), Clarke (1992, 104, and note 8), Nelkin (2004, 219), and Pereboom 
(2008a, 297) all agree about this judgement. One exception is Nielsen (2011, 410). 
23 See e.g. Taylor (1966, 170–84), van Inwagen (1983, 160), Coffman and Warfield 
(2005), and Henden (2010) for slightly different versions. 
24 See e.g. Dennett (2015, 118–26) and Kapitan (1986, 1996). 
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compatible with what he knows. This is now explicitly conceded by those who 
think sceptics can deliberate rationally (see Nelkin 2011, 130; Pereboom and 
McKenna 2016, 297–298). 
Instead, we can explain Beau’s irrationality differently, by using the notion 
of deliberative efficacy. He knows (or should know) that, in an important 
sense,25 his deliberation is futile and yet he deliberates. Therein lies the 
irrationality; not in his belief that he lacks abilities or opportunities. 
This approach is pursued by Clarke (1992, 103), Nelkin (2004, 223), and 
Pereboom (2008, 2014). But as they each acknowledge, we need to refine the 
efficacy requirement. Take again our eccentric Dean. If he told me that he would 
give me a thousand pounds (or a job) if I deliberated about whether to accept a 
job he had not offered, my deliberation would be efficacious. But it would be 
irrational in the sense that we identified in §2.2. Hence, to deliberate rationally, 
I must believe that my deliberation is causally efficacious in the right way. 
After reviewing several formulations which I cannot present here for 
reasons of space,26 Pereboom endorses the following requirement: 
Deliberative Efficacy: In order to rationally deliberate about 
whether to do A1 or A2, where A1 and A2 are distinct [and 
incompatible] actions, an agent must believe that if as a result of 
her deliberating about whether to do A1 or A2 she were to judge 
that it would be best to do A1, then under normal conditions, she 
would also, on the basis of this deliberation, do A1; and similarly 
for A2. (Pereboom 2008, 299) 
This explains Beau’s irrationality. He does not (and could not) believe that were 
he to choose to watch one film he would. (We should perhaps replace ‘having 
judged an option to be best’ with ‘having chosen an option’. This is to cover 
cases where we cannot judge that an option is best, perhaps because our options 
are equally good, even though we must choose.) 
Bottom line, we have a case for the view that leeway sceptics can deliberate 
rationally and a case for the view that they cannot. They can if the right 
explanation of Beau’s irrationality is, with Deliberative Efficacy, that he does 
not believe that his deliberation is efficacious. They cannot if the right 
explanation of Beau’s irrationality is, with BOAT, that he does not believe he 
can go see each movie. This is the antinomy. 
3.3 Belief or Disbelief? A Correction from Provision 
Yet the antinomy needs to be marginally corrected. For neither BOAT nor 
Deliberative Efficacy is true strictly speaking. Correspondingly, the substantial 
 
25 It might still be important for accidental reasons that they deliberate, for instance to 
cultivate good character. 
26 See Kapitan (1986, 247, 1996, 437), Clarke (1992, 103), and Nelkin (2004; 2011). 
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question is not whether rational deliberation requires a belief in leeway, but 
whether it requires a disbelief in the lack of leeway. This is my second correction to 
the dialectic. 
Consider again James, who wonders whether to take Oxford Street or 
Divinity Street to go to work. He does not believe that any is blocked or 
available; he simply assumes, reasonably, that they are available for the purpose 
of practical deliberation, hoping for the best. This is rational. But BOAT tells 
us that James should have a belief that both streets are open, which he lacks. And 
deliberative Efficacy tells us that James should have a belief that his choice will 
be efficacious, which he also lacks. Thus, both BOAT and Deliberative Efficacy 
give us the wrong verdict, i.e. that James’ deliberation is irrational. 
In our two principles, we can replace ‘believes’ with ‘practically assumes’.27 
The limit with this strategy is that then we must answer another question: what 
can we assume, provided that we believe such and such? We can give a partial 
answer to this question. If S believes (reasonably) that p, ¬p should not be 
amongst S’s practical assumptions. This means that we can have doxastic 
constraints, but that they should be negative.  
We should replace BOAT with a principle about disbelief: 
DOAT: If S deliberates rationally about whether to Φ or Ψ, then 
S does not believe that <she cannot either Φ or Ψ (not knowing 
which)>.28 
Or, differently put: to deliberate rationally, one must lack the belief that one 
lacks alternatives. Contrary to BOAT, DOAT respects the provisional character 
of practical deliberation. It also allows leeway agnostics to deliberate rationally.29 
We should replace Deliberative Efficacy in the same way:  
Deliberative Non-Inefficacy: If S deliberates rationally about 
whether to Φ or Ψ, then S does not believe that, under normal 
circumstances, if she were to decide to Φ, she would not or that, 
if she were to decide to Ψ, she would not. 
In order to deliberate rationally, an agent must fail to believe that her 
deliberation is inefficacious in a sense. Contrary to Deliberative Efficacy, 
Deliberative Non-Inefficacy respects the provisional character of deliberation. 
We used our unified account of practical deliberation (§2) to correct the 
dialectic about free will and deliberation (§3). We saw that the substantial 
 
27 Bratman (1992, 12–13) makes a similar proposal regarding efficacy. 
28 S does not infringe DOAT automatically in virtue of believing (truly) that she can 
only do Φ or Ψ since they are exclusive. This would involve a de re/de dicto confusion like 
claiming that I could not do otherwise because I ‘cannot do what I don’t’.  
29 As Bratman (1992, 8) thinks is plausible. 
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question is not whether determinists can deliberate or even whether deliberators 
must believe in leeway, but whether leeway sceptics can deliberate rationally. That’s 
the Deliberation Question. We must now choose one of its antinomic answers. 
4. Disputation: An Argument from Decision 
We turn to giving an answer to the Deliberation Question: leeway sceptics are 
barred from rational deliberation, at least most of the time. How can we defend 
this?  
Our starting point, DOAT, is quite weak. It credibly explains Beau’s 
irrationality and it implies that the leeway sceptic cannot deliberate rationally. 
But, as we have just seen, it has an appealing explanatory competitor, 
Deliberative Non-Inefficacy, which does not imply that leeway sceptics cannot 
deliberate rationally. Of course, we could in principle accept both principles 
since they encode necessary conditions on the same object.30 Yet, as things 
stand, DOAT is mainly appealing as an explanatory principle. So, if Deliberative 
Non-Inefficacy leaves no irrationality to be explained, we have little reason to 
grant DOAT.31 
And yet it is hard to imagine a counterexample to DOAT.32 We should not 
disregard this difficulty. It invites us to find an argument for DOAT, or indeed 
for the direct conclusion that leeway sceptics cannot deliberate rationally. Here 
is mine: 
(First Premise) If a leeway sceptic deliberates rationally about 
whether to Φ or Ψ, she can rationally decide to Φ or to Ψ. 
(Second Premise) If she can rationally decide to Φ or Ψ, she does 
not believe that she cannot either Φ or Ψ (not knowing which)—unless 
‘can’ is a conditional (or dispositional) notion. 
(Third Premise) If ‘can’ is a conditional (or dispositional) notion, leeway 
scepticism is false. 
Therefore,  
Leeway sceptics cannot deliberate rationally, unless leeway scepticism is false. 33 
Most of the action occurs in the Second Premise and so I shall focus on it. If 
we leave aside the italicised part, we get an argument for DOAT. If S deliberates 
 
30 In fact, some (see e.g. Taylor 1966, 171; Pereboom 300–302) believe that we need 
several such conditions. 
31 Nelkin (2004, 220) makes this point. 
32 Coffman and Warfield (2005, 42) make this point. 
33 This implies that the leeway sceptic is condemned to irrationality, for it is irrational 
to openly believe a proposition that they know they believe either falsely or irrationally 
(Chevarie-Cossette 2019a, 68–69). 
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about whether to Φ or Ψ, then S must not believe that <she cannot either Φ or 
Ψ (not knowing which)>. For, if she so believes, S cannot rationally decide to 
Φ or Ψ (First Premise), which in turn bars her from rational deliberation 
(Second Premise). 
4.1 Aiming at a Decision 
The First Premise mentions the leeway sceptic. In reality, it rests on the more 
general idea that we deliberate rationally about two options only when it is 
rational for us to decide in favour of (at least) one of them. I cannot rationally 
deliberate about whether to master Russian or Japanese this weekend because I 
cannot rationally decide to either. For deliberation is a decisional activity. (We 
can draw an analogy with theoretical deliberation, which is presumably a 
doxastic and rational activity. If a believer ponders two propositions which are 
relevantly flawed—perhaps one proposition is unbelievable and the other one 
is unreasonable—the deliberation is itself flawed.) 
What if the practical deliberator cannot rationally decide to Φ or to Ψ but 
is unaware of this? Perhaps she can deliberate rationally about what to do, contra 
the First Premise. We can imagine Sophie deliberating about which of her 
children to save and who, at some point in the deliberation, realises that she will 
literally be incapable of deciding. This does not make her previous deliberation 
irrational, because when she weighed reasons, she could reasonably assume that 
she could decide.34 
I do not want to push back against this suspicion. For I think that it simply 
invites an amendment which is inconsequential for our purpose. We can restrict 
the argument to the circumstances in which deliberators should be aware of 
their inability to decide. An agent who deliberates in the reasonable ignorance 
of her inability to rationally decide to Φ or to Ψ might do it rationally. This 
amendment is inconsequential because the sceptic should know—at least upon 
reading this paper!—that she cannot decide to Φ or to Ψ, qua my Second 
Premise. Remember: the crux of my argument is my Second Premise. 
4.2 A Constraint on Decisions 
My Second Premise targets the sceptic’s capacity to decide. To give it some 
plausibility, let us start with a simpler principle:  
Realistic Decision: To rationally decide to Φ, one must assume 
that one can Φ—and so one must not believe that one cannot Φ. 
Once we have established it, we can show that we should endorse the Second 
Premise for similar reasons. 
Realistic Decision respects the provisional nature of deliberation. If, as I will 
argue, it is impossible for a subject to decide rationally to do what he believes 
 
34 Thanks to Dana Nelkin for this helpful objection. 
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he cannot do, it remains possible for a subject to decide rationally to do what 
he lacks the belief that he can do. James can decide to take Divinity Street even 
if he lacks the belief that he can. 
We cannot rationally decide to Φ if we believe we cannot Φ—or, to use a 
classic phrase and ‘we cannot intend to do the impossible’ (see Hampshire 
1960).35 This principle is immediately intuitive; permit me to argue for it anyway. 
Imagine the following. I decide, ‘I shall swim this afternoon, though I 
cannot’ or I promise, ‘I can’t help you, but I promise I will.’36 This decision and 
this promise are irrational or otherwise odd. They remind us of Moore-
paradoxical assertions or thoughts like, ‘It’s raining but I don’t know it is.’ While 
the expressed propositions are not contradictions, there is something wrong 
with their utterance, wherever the wrongness lies.  
Why are this decision and this promise infelicitous? They do not fulfil their 
role. Take Moore-Paradoxical assertions. They might be infelicitous because the 
normal role of beliefs is to connect us to the world, which is only achieved well 
with knowledge. The beliefs that we assert are ‘botched’ beliefs, which explains 
the infelicity. Of course, this explanation is more controversial than the 
judgement that Moore-Paradoxical assertions are infelicitous. But it confirms 
our judgement. In turn, this supports a general norm, namely the knowledge 
norm of assertion: one should not assert an unknown proposition.37 
We can adopt a similar strategy with decisions and promises. What is their 
role? First, imagine someone who fails to make decisions in her life. This is 
perhaps impossible, unless the imagined person is permanently unconscious. 
But we can imagine someone whose decisions play a relatively minor role in her 
life. This person never decides anything in advance. She lets the events unfold 
and she allows her immediate desires to guide her on the spot. In a word, she 
never plans anything. Now, imagine someone who fails to make promises in her 
life. This person leads a possible but miserable life. She must be exceptionally 
lonely, for she cannot coordinate with other people. She can communicate her 
desire to see her friend tomorrow at 10:00, but unless there is a promise to meet, 
this kind of desire is doomed to often remain frustrated. 
 
35 Hampshire and others discussed, as I will, whether an agent may intend to perform 
an action she believes she cannot perform. Whether an agent may intend to perform an 
action which she believes is metaphysically impossible is a different question, one which 
depends on whether subjects can Φ when Φing is metaphysically impossible (see 
Spencer 2017) or not (see Nguyen 2019) and on whether, more generally, ‘can’ is a 
kind of possibility (see Kenny 1976, van Inwagen 2017, chap. 14). 
36 This does not work for the sense of ‘can’ (or ‘free’) which is sensitive to obligations 
(see Hyman 2015, chap. 4). There is nothing paradoxical about: ‘I shall Φ but I cannot, 
i.e. it is prohibited.’ 
37 This explanation draws heavily on Williamson (2000). 
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So, planning (or coordination) is a key role of decision—and promise—
making. This explains why ‘I shall swim this afternoon, though I cannot’ and ‘I 
can’t help you, but I promise I will’ are infelicitous. The plan that they 
recommend is imaginary. And so a third party who receives such a promise 
should remain unmoved. The infelicitous character of these assertions in turn 
supports a general norm on decision-making, namely Realistic Decision: to 
rationally decide to Φ, one must not believe that one cannot Φ. 
Once we have accepted Realistic Decision, we should accept the second 
premise, which targets the sceptic more specifically: 
(Second Premise) If she can rationally decide to Φ or Ψ, she does 
not believe that she cannot Φ or Ψ not knowing which—unless ‘can’ 
is a conditional or dispositional notion. 
Why? Consider thoughts similar to, ‘I shall Φ although I can’t.’ Take, first, ‘I 
shall Φ, although it is very unlikely that I can’ and, ‘I sure believe I can’t Φ, but 
I shall.’ These decisions are almost as unreasonable as the first. The same goes 
for the kind of proposition relevant to cases like we have seen earlier: ‘I either 
cannot Φ or Ψ, I don’t know which, but I shall Φ’. We can justify these 
additional judgements of infelicity. We make decisions, or promises, to 
coordinate or plan. But a plan involving courses of action one believes or knows 
to be improbable is hardly a good plan. 
This raises the question of where to draw the line. A subject who considers 
a hundred options, knowing that only one is blocked but not knowing which, 
can be rational. But she cannot be rational if she is in the reverse case, where 
she knows only one of the hundred options is within reach. I take it that the 
two-option case is more like the latter. (If I’m wrong, then strangely enough 
perhaps the sceptic is only barred from rational deliberation involving 
sufficiently many options.) 
At any rate the leeway sceptic is in trouble. To make this more precise, let 
us compare her deliberation with that of an irrational character that we have 
previously encountered. Beau deliberates about what to go see. He believes that 
he cannot go see one of the two films he is considering. He cannot rationally 
decide to go see Isle of Dogs, since he believes that either Isle of Dogs or The Square 
is not showing, not knowing which. The same goes for The Square. This is 
confirmed by the fact that it would infelicitous for Beau to say in the 
circumstances, ‘I shall see The Square’ or, ‘I promise to go see Isle of Dogs’. Such 
a decision or promise would fail to adequately contribute to a good plan. 
Now, take Skye. She deliberates about whether to go for a run or for a swim. 
Being a serious leeway sceptic, she believes that she cannot do one of these 
things, not knowing which. Skye cannot rationally decide to run, so long as she 
believes that she cannot either run or swim not knowing which. The same 
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applies for swimming. And so, until she learns what she will do, she cannot 
rationally deliberate about what to do. 
Skye’s case is slightly different from Beau’s case. For it seems that Skye 
could rationally decide or promise to go for a run and plan accordingly. But 
why? Simply because Skye can predict that she will in fact go. From this 
prediction, she believes, in accordance with her scepticism, that she can go for 
a run (and that she cannot go for a swim). Let us instead suppose that Skye has 
not changed her beliefs about what she will do. She does not predict what she 
will do—and thus what she can do since she is a leeway sceptic. The possibility 
that she cannot run remains too vivid to decide or promise to run. So, if Skye’s 
decision or promise is rational, and thus different from Beau’s, it is only because 
she has changed her beliefs about what she will do.  
The sceptic might insist that this not a problem because Skye will always 
adjust her beliefs about what she will do after making decisions. She will never 
be in Beau’s situation and so will never be so irrational. I agree that Skye is more 
rational than Beau, but on closer examination, we see some defect in her 
deliberation. 
Consider the timing of Skye’s deliberation. If she deliberates practically, 
then at t1, she decides to Φ; at t2, she might form the belief that she will Φ; and 
at t3 that she can Φ. At t3, Skye is fine: her decision to Φ aligns with her belief 
that she can. But between t1 and t2 there is a gap where she has decided to do 
something which, from her viewpoint, she still likely cannot. That’s not to say 
that she cannot or should not run. But there is something wrong with her 
decision-making. 
This gap widens when Skye is not confident about her decision. Imagine 
that she decides (or promises) to visit her mother in a fortnight, although she 
believes that she will not and so cannot. In accordance with the sceptic’s 
response, Skye should normally adjust her beliefs about what she will do and so 
about what she can do. But her uncertainty persists for a week and so she makes 
no adjustments. For a week, Skye has maintained a decision to Φ while believing 
that she could not Φ. By contrast, a non-sceptic can make and maintain the 
same decision rationally since his belief that he will not fulfil his promise does 
not prevent him from believing or assuming that he can. Similarly, we can 
imagine that Skye deliberates for a long time about whether to do something 
she believes she will not and so cannot. This will be irrational. 
The lesson is this. Sceptical deliberation almost necessarily involves short 
moments of irrationality. But even if sceptics disregard these cases, perhaps 
because of their length, they are stuck with other cases, i.e. cases where they are 
not confident that they will in fact act in accordance with their decision. Leeway 
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sceptics must believe that their decisions are set in stone, or else deliberate 
irrationally. 
This suggests that the sceptic is forced to blur the line between theoretical 
and practical deliberation. Answering the questions, ‘what shall I do?’ and, ‘what 
will I do?’ are distinct on two counts. First, it is perfectly intelligible and rational 
to decide to do something in spite of the fact that we suspect that we will fail to 
do what we decided to do. But the sceptic cannot do this rationally. For her 
rational decision must imply prediction. Second, it is perfectly intelligible and 
rational to predict that I will do something without deciding to do it. Perhaps I 
find it regretful that I will act in this way, or perhaps I am not ready to decide 
to do it because I have yet to identify the right reasons to act.38 Since the leeway 
sceptic believes that she has only one path, there might be little point in trying 
to resist something she has predicted she will do and thus cannot avoid. 
4.3 Efficacy and the Third Premise 
It is tempting for the leeway sceptic to object to Realistic Decision and to my 
Second Premise that all I have done is postpone the problem. For I have used 
contentious norms of decision-making instead of contentious norms of 
deliberation (like DOAT). In so doing, I have invited the same response: 
whether a decision is rational does not depend on beliefs about what one can 
do, but only on beliefs about efficacy. Decisions like ‘I shall Φ, although I 
cannot’ are infelicitous precisely because they are not sufficiently efficacious 
decisions. Beau’s decision to go see one film is not sufficiently efficacious and 
so he is irrational. But Skye’s decision is sufficiently efficacious and so she is 
rational. 
This is a tempting line, but it is not as promising as it looks for the leeway 
sceptic. Consider how she understands an efficacious decision. I take it she will 
more or less repeat what she said about efficacious deliberation (see §2.3).39 A 
deliberator considering Φ and Ψ and who respects the efficacy requirement on 
deliberation assumes that if she decides to Φ, she will Φ (in normal circumstances) 
and similarly for Ψ. A decision-maker who is about to decide to Φ and who 
respects the efficacy requirement on decision-making assumes that if she decides 
to Φ, she will Φ (in normal circumstances). 
The efficacy requirement on decision-making looks like one reading of 
Realistic Decision. It looks like it claims that someone can only decide rationally 
to Φ if one assumes that she can Φ, i.e. that if she decides to Φ, she will Φ (in normal 
circumstances). In a word, an endorsement of the efficacy requirement on 
 
38 See Waller (1985, 50), Cowan (1969, 59), Clarke (1992, 108), and Pereboom (2008, 
293). 
39 I believe the same problems will arise if we give it a dispositional reading, which Nelkin 
considers (2011, sect. 6). 
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decision-making likely involves an endorsement of the conditional account of 
‘can’. 
Two more clues make me think that Efficacious Decision involves an 
endorsement of the conditional account of ‘can’. The first touches on the 
specification of ‘normal circumstances’. In §2.2 and §3.2, we saw that an 
eccentric Dean could ask me to deliberate about whether to accept a job I had 
not been offered; and give it to me if I so deliberated. This time, the eccentric 
Dean could ask me instead to decide to accept the job. The Dean is a fink: he 
makes sure that the conditional ‘if I decide to accept the job, I will’ is true, even 
though I lack the ability or opportunity to accept the job. Anyone familiar with 
the debates about the conditional of ‘can’ will recognise standard difficulties 
with the account (see e.g. Vihvelin 2013).  
The second clue touches on the paradoxical decisions we have worked on. 
The leeway sceptic explained the infelicity of ‘I shall Φ although I cannot’ using 
the concept of inefficacy, and she defined inefficacy in terms of a conditional. 
It seems, yet again, like she is reading ‘I cannot’ as the negation of a conditional, 
and so ‘can’ as a conditional. She is endorsing the conditional account of ‘can’. 
A conditional account of ‘can’ might be a good account. So what’s the 
problem with the leeway sceptic using Efficacious Decision—and so the 
conditional account of ‘can’—in rejecting my Second Premise? The problem is 
that the conditional account of ‘can’ cannot feature in an objection to my 
Second Premise. For remember its proviso: 
(Second Premise) If she can rationally decide to Φ or Ψ, the sceptic 
does not believe that she cannot do Φ or Ψ not knowing which—
unless ‘can’ is a conditional (or dispositional) notion. 
If we follow this proviso, then the third premise becomes relevant:  
(Third Premise) If ‘can’ is a conditional (or dispositional) notion, 
leeway scepticism is false. 
The Third Premise is true because sometimes there are actions that we do not 
perform—and so cannot perform, according to leeway scepticism—that still 
satisfy the relevant conditionals. I wrote this paper. If I had decided to refrain 
from writing it, I would have so refrained (under normal circumstances). On the 
conditional account of ‘can’, I could have done otherwise than I did. But leeway 
scepticism claims that I lack the ability to do otherwise. So, if the conditional 
account of ‘can’ is correct, leeway scepticism is false. 
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5. Three Objections 
5.1 Equivocation 
Can’t the leeway sceptic simply use two senses of ‘can’, a conditional sense and 
a non-conditional sense?40 She could deny the existence of the non-conditional 
‘can’ and maintain that it is irrelevant to deliberation and decision-making. And 
she could accept the existence of the conditional ‘can’ and maintain that sense 
of ‘can’ is relevant to deliberation.41 Accordingly, my argument equivocates: 
‘can’ does not refer to the same concept in the second and third premises. 
First, this objection is ad hoc. It is ad hoc for leeway sceptics to use different 
accounts of ‘can’ depending on whether they work on deliberation or on 
responsibility and freedom. We need a justification for such a variation. 
Second, the sense of ‘can’ relevant to freedom and responsibility is in fact 
the same as the sense relevant to deliberation. Why? Because it is in deliberating 
and in pursuing its aim—decision or choice—that we most paradigmatically 
exercise our freedom or responsibility (if we ever do). If the ‘can’ of deliberation 
were clearly conditional, this would be a strong reason not to be a leeway sceptic. 
 To illustrate, consider how belief in unfreedom can constrain deliberation. ‘I 
am not free to swim this afternoon, but I shall’ is just as paradoxical as the 
paradoxical decisions we considered earlier.42 Throughout the paper, the reader 
could replace can-claims with freedom-claims and get equally plausible 
arguments. 
5.2 The Alternative Deliberation Objection 
In a similar spirit, the leeway sceptic might argue that there are other forms of 
deliberation which I have not shown she cannot engage in and which can replace 
practical deliberation. But the prospects are gloomy.  
First, the leeway sceptic cannot replace deliberation about what to do with 
deliberation about what to try to do. This is because she believes not only that no 
one can ever do otherwise, but that no one can ever try to do otherwise (unless 
one has in fact tried). Non-sceptics typically believe that there is an asymmetry 
between trying to act, which we can almost always do, and acting, which we often 
cannot do. (It is this asymmetry that I argued in §2.3 the Stoics overplay.) For 
 
40 See Dennett (2015), who agrees, and Kenny (1976) and van Inwagen (2017, chaps 
10, 13), who do not. 
41 On multiple occasions (2004, 225, 228, 233), Nelkin points out that the kind of 
alternatives relevant to rational deliberation might differ from the kind of alternatives 
relevant to freedom. Yet, Nelkin’s concluding remarks suggest that our view on 
deliberation and on freedom should be linked. 
42 But see note 35. 
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the leeway sceptic, there is no such asymmetry. It follows that my main 
argument applies to deliberation about trying (replace ‘Φ’ with ‘try to Ψ’ in §4). 
Second, the leeway sceptic cannot replace practical deliberation with 
conditional deliberation, i.e. deliberation which is premised on mere suppositions. 
She can engage in conditional deliberation, since it does not have the same strict 
rational requirements. And so she can, if she wants, suppose that she has leeway 
just like I can suppose that I will win the lottery. But, this is not enough for 
practical purposes. To use Michael Bratman’s example (1992, 9), the supposition 
that I have a million dollars and the conclusion that if I did, I would invest it, 
will not—and should not—lead me to call my broker. So how is the sceptic 
supposed to use her supposition that she can Φ? Suppositions, it seems, are 
insufficient for practical deliberation and thus for planning. They endow the 
sceptic not with plans but with dreams. 
Third, the sceptic cannot replace practical deliberation with theoretical 
deliberation. Exploring this idea, Tony Honoré wrote (1999, 159), about 
sceptical deliberation: 
We should […] come to reinterpret the experiences we call “making up 
our minds”; and “reaching a decision”. We should come to think of 
them more like “becoming aware of our intention”. 
This is insufficient. Sometimes we simply do not have an intention; we need to 
form it, not find it inside us. In Dworkin’s words: ‘You cannot lift yourself 
above yourself just to watch how you choose. You must choose.’ (2011, 223)43 
As we have seen, theoretical deliberation involves more than introspection: 
it also involves posing the question: ‘what should I do?’. This is more promising 
than mere introspection (see Nielsen 2011). But this activity is insufficient, for 
it does not deal adequately with irresolvable dilemmas. When we have options 
that we cannot weigh properly against each other, we sometimes must abandon 
theoretical deliberation and make a decision. The sceptic is no exception to this. 
5.3 The Rational Irrationality Objection 
A third and last objection is that there are independent counterexamples to 
DOAT such as the following: 
If, like the rock climber Aron Ralston, I find that my hand is stuck 
under a boulder in the Utah Canyons, and I determine, after days of 
waiting for help, that my only means of survival is cutting off the hand 
with a pocket knife, I will probably doubt whether I have the courage 
and resilience to execute the plan. But given what will happen if I don’t, 
it would be irrational of me not to entertain this possibility, despite my 
doubts about my ability to follow through. (Nielsen 2011, 413–14) 
 
43 For a rare opposition to this claim, see Blackmore (2013). 
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This is a good putative counterexample to BOAT: deliberation does not strictly 
require a belief that our options are available.44 For it to be a real 
counterexample to DOAT, we need to add that, in Nielsen’s example, she in 
fact believes that she cannot cut off her own hand. 
A similar kind of counterexample, namely a case of desperate action, was 
raised by those argued in the sixties that we can in fact ‘intend to do the 
impossible’ (against Realistic Decision). We might think that it is possible that a 
lifeguard intends to save a swimmer he believes to be dead (Thalberg 1962, 54) 
or that a prisoner intends to resist torture even though he is convinced that he 
cannot (Anscombe 1963, 94). The thought is that if the prisoner succeeded in 
resisting torture or if the lifeguard succeeded in saving the man, this resisting 
and this saving would have been intentional. So, the lifeguard could intend to 
save the man and the prisoner could intend to resist torture. In terms of 
decisions: the lifeguard has decided to bring the swimmer back to life and the 
prisoner has decided to resist; they succeed, and so their action is deliberate. 
I have three answers to the alleged counterexamples. The first is to 
redescribe the action that the subject decides in favour of. This is Stuart 
Hampshire’s solution (1960, 134): all that the prisoner could decide is to resist 
torture as long as possible. Then, it happens to be longer than he thought. This 
means that his action of resisting until the torturer stops was deliberate, but 
under a different description. Similarly, when deliberating about what to do, 
Nielsen might provisionally entertain a different kind of possibility such as 
‘make just this cut.’ This solution is elegant, but it might not apply easily to cases 
like that of the lifeguard (see Thalberg 1962, 54). 
A second response uses the notion of pragmatic encroachment and admits 
that the subjects in the counterexamples are rational.45 In fact, the stakes are 
very high in all the examples; and it seems like any counterexample to Realistic 
Decision or DOAT will have to be similarly dramatic. We could insist that we 
cannot decide or deliberate rationally to do what we believe (rationally) to be 
impossible. But it is irrational to believe that these options are impossible 
because the stakes affect what we can rationally believe. In a similar vein, we 
could insist that what we can reasonably assume for the purpose of deliberation 
is directly sensitive to stakes; and so that there are exceptions to DOAT.46 
However, to accept stake-sensitivity of assumptions is not to accept that 
anything goes when stakes are high. For instance, when stuck on the rock face 
of a mountain, I still cannot rationally assume that I can jump to the other side 
 
44 For a similar case, see James (1912, 96–97). 
45 See e.g. Hawthorne (2004). 
46 See Bratman (1992) for a defence of this view. 
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of the valley (even if, unbeknownst to me, a gust of wind would carry me slowly 
to the other side if I jumped). 
A third response, anticipated by our discussion of rationality in §2, claims 
that the putative counterexamples feature ‘rational irrationality.’ We can admit 
that in such cases there is a rational decision, intention, or deliberation but that 
they are irrational in another sense. That is, we could insist that Anscombe, 
Nielsen, and Thalberg play instrumental rationality against another kind of 
rationality. The lifeguard, the prisoner, and the hiker might be in fact rational to 
decide or to deliberate as they do and yet irrational in deciding or in deliberating. 
As we have discussed in §2, this latter kind of rationality could be epistemic or 
deliberative. Differently put, the counterexample might invoke the wrong kind 
of reasons—instrumental reasons—weighing in favour of some decisions. In 
general, we would happily become dunces of ‘theoretical’ or ‘internal’ rationality 
in order to be heroes of instrumental rationality. But it is only in these heroic or 
high-stake cases that we can even begin to imagine what it would be like to 
decide to do what we think is impossible or to deliberate about it. 
This raises a connected objection. The leeway sceptic could insist that she 
does not care about making epistemic or deliberative mistakes—she only cares 
about instrumental rationality. I can only address this worry very briefly since it 
touches on general issues about the normativity of rationality. 
Let me first insist that leeway sceptics should deliberate, because it is a good 
means-to end device.47 And they do deliberate, which shows that they have more 
sense than doctrinal coherence. Since it would be irrational to stop deliberating 
completely, the only way to be adequately rational is to reject leeway scepticism 
or to suspend judgement.  
Now, whether it matters to be rational or not depends more generally on 
whether we should care about respecting epistemic norms or constitutive norms 
of the activities that we engage in. There is a tradition, personified in James 
(1912), according to which it does because we are passionate about rationality—
we desire it and we should weigh this desire with others. If this is right, then the 
sceptic has a cause for regret. (We sometimes see this passion for rationality in 
leeway sceptics when they insist that free will is but an illusion.) There is also a 
tradition, personified in Clifford (1887), according to which these norms matter 
on their own and perhaps so much that they are properly ethical. If, however, 
these norms do not matter for their own sake, it does not follow that they do 
not matter instrumentally here. Perhaps in disregarding DOAT, leeway sceptics 
will acquire bad deliberative habits which will cause them further troubles. Let 
me leave this stone unturned. 
 
47 See Dennett (2015, 114). 
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6. Conclusion 
I had three aims: a constructive aim, i.e. to present a fresh and unified account 
of deliberation (§2); a corrective aim, i.e. to correct the set-up of the 
Deliberation Question (§3); and a disputative aim, i.e. to argue that leeway 
sceptics cannot deliberate rationally (§4–5). Again, it is likely that my account 
and correction is more convincing than my disputative argument. 
But I think I have mounted a case for the latter that deserves some 
consideration. Leeway sceptics must figure out what to do next. If their doctrine 
is true and I am right, then, as Castañeda claimed, the world is in a sense ‘ugly’ 
(1975, 134): we are forced to choose between a false belief and an irrational 
practice.48 
Being myself sympathetic to leeway scepticism, I want to suggest two 
alternatives. The first is for the leeway sceptic to claim that we can rationally 
decide to do what we believe we cannot do. But then she will have to explain 
the outlandishness of assertions like ‘I shall swim, though I cannot.’ This strikes 
me as a lost cause, but then again perhaps it’s possible to rationally decide to 
win a lost cause. 
The second alternative is to do what I have hinted at in §5.3, namely to argue 
that rationality does not matter as much as we think. If she takes this last route, 
the leeway sceptic will be playing a dangerous game. For, then, it seems easy to 
reply that the only way to accept generalised deliberative irrationality is to 
endorse a form of general pragmatism. But this is a double-edged sword for 
sceptics. My belief that I can choose amongst real alternatives makes me happy, 
so why should I take leeway scepticism seriously? 
7. References 
Anscombe, G. E. M. 1963. Intention. 2nd ed. Library of Philosophy and Logic. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Austin, J. L. 1979. Philosophical Papers. Oxford University Press.  
Blackmore, Susan. 2013. ‘Living without Free Will’. In Exploring the Illusion of 
Free Will, edited by Gregg D. Caruso, 161–76. Lexington Books. 
Bratman, Michael E. 1992. ‘Practical Reasoning and Acceptance in a Context’. 
Mind 101 (401): 1–16. 
Broome, John. 2013. Rationality Through Reasoning. Wiley-Blackwell. 
Castañeda, Hector-Neri. 1975. Thinking and Doing: The Philosophical Foundations of 
Institutions. Philosophical Studies Series ; v. 7. Dordrecht: Reidel. 
 
48 This is a situation that those who think that it is self-defeating to believe in free will 
scepticism even if it is true contemplate. For a discussion see Chevarie-Cossette (2019b). 
25 
 
 
Chevarie-Cossette, Simon-Pierre. Forthcoming. ‘Knowing about Responsibility: 
A Trilemma’. American Philosophical Quarterly. 
———. 2019a. ‘Self-Defeating Beliefs and Misleading Reasons’. International 
Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (1): 57–72.  
———. 2019b. ‘Is Free Will Scepticism Self-Defeating?’ European Journal of 
Analytic Philosophy 15 (2): 55–78. 
Clarke, Randolph K. 1992. ‘Deliberation and Beliefs About One’s Abilities’. 
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (2): 101–13. 
Clifford, William K. 1877. ‘The Ethics of Belief’. First Published. 
Coffman, E. J., and Ted A. Warfield. 2005. ‘Deliberation and Metaphysical 
Freedom’. Midwest Studies In Philosophy 29 (1): 25–44. 
Cohen, L. Jonathan. 1989. ‘Belief and Acceptance’. Mind 98 (391): 367–89. 
Cohen, Yishai. 2018. ‘Deliberating in the Presence of Manipulation’. Canadian 
Journal of Philosophy 48 (1): 85–105.  
Cowan, J. L. 1969. ‘Deliberation and Determinism’. American Philosophical 
Quarterly 6 (1): 53–61. 
Dennett, Daniel C. 2015. Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting. 
Cambridge: MIT Press.  
Dworkin, Ronald. 2011. Justice for Hedgehogs. Harvard University Press. 
Fischer, John Martin. 1994. The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on 
Control. Blackwell. 
Hampshire, Stuart. 1960. Thought and Action (1959). Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press. 
Hawthorne, John. 2004. Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Henden, Edmund. 2010. ‘Deliberation Incompatibilism’. Dialectica 64 (3): 313–
33.  
Hieronymi, Pamela. 2005. ‘The Wrong Kind of Reason’. The Journal of 
Philosophy 102 (9): 437–57. 
Honoré, Tony. 1999. Responsibility and Fault. Hart Publishing. 
Hyman, John. 2015. Action, Knowledge, and Will. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Inwagen, Peter van. 1983. An Essay on Free Will. Oxford University Press. 
———. 2017. Thinking about Free Will. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
James, William. 1912. The Will to Believe: And Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. 
Auckland, New Zealand: Floating Press.  
Kapitan, Tomis. 1986. ‘Deliberation and the Presumption of Open 
Alternatives’. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (April): 230–51. 
———. 1996. ‘Modal Principles in the Metaphysics of Free Will’. Philosophical 
Perspectives 10: 419–45. 
Kavka, Gregory S. 1983. ‘The Toxin Puzzle’. Analysis 43 (1): 33–36. 
26 
 
 
Kelly, Thomas. 2003. ‘Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A 
Critique’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3): 612–40.  
Kenny, Anthony. 1976. Will, Freedom and Power. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Kiesewetter, Benjamin. 2017. The Normativity of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Levy, Neil. 2011. Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral 
Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
MacIntyre, A. C. 1957. ‘Determinism’. Mind 66 (261): 28–41. 
McKenna, Michael, and Derk Pereboom. 2016. Free Will: A Contemporary 
Introduction. Routledge. 
Nelkin, Dana Kay. 2004. ‘Deliberative Alternatives’. Philosophical Topics 32 
(1/2): 215–40. 
———. 2011. Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. 
Nguyen, Anthony. forthcoming. ‘Unable to Do the Impossible’. Mind 1.  
Nielsen, Karen Margrethe. 2011. ‘Deliberation as Inquiry: Aristotle’s Alternative 
to the Presumption of Open Alternatives’. The Philosophical Review 120 (3): 
383–421.  
Nolfi, Kate. 2018. ‘Why Only Evidential Considerations Can Justify Belief’. In 
Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Pereboom, Derk. 2008. ‘A Compatibilist Account of the Epistemic Conditions 
on Rational Deliberation’. The Journal of Ethics 12 (3–4): 287–306.  
———. 2014. Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Pettit, Philip. 1989. ‘Determinism with Deliberation’. Analysis 49 (1): 42–44.  
Raz, Joseph. 1999. Practical Reason and Norms. Oxford University Press.  
Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1946. L’Existentialisme Est un Humanisme. Nagel Paris. 
Schroeder, Mark. 2007. Slaves of the Passions. Oxford University Press. 
Searle, John R. 2007. ‘Neuroscience, Intentionality and Free Will: Reply to 
Habermas’. Philosophical Explorations 10 (1): 69–76.  
Spencer, Jack. 2017. ‘Able to Do the Impossible’. Mind 126 (502): 466–97.  
Taylor, Richard. 1966. Action and Purpose. New York: Humanities Press. 
Thalberg, I. 1962. ‘Intending the Impossible’. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 
40 (1): 49–56. 
Vihvelin, Kadri. 2013. Causes, Laws, and Free Will: Why Determinism 
Doesn’t Matter. Oxford University Press.  
Waller, Bruce N. 1985. ‘Deliberating about the Inevitable’. Analysis 45 (1): 48–
52.  
Watson, Gary. 2003. ‘The Work of the Will’. In Weakness of Will and Practical 
Irrationality, edited by Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet, 172–200. 
Oxford University Press. 
Williamson, Timothy. 2000. Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford University Press. 
